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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAYDON ELLIOTT WINGER, 
Plaintiff, 
-YS.-
I~SURANC:B~ COl\IPAKY OF 
~ORTH A1\H~RICA, 
-vs.-
Def end ant, Third Party 
Plaintiff anrl Appellant, 
L.A. BOWEN, clha L.A. BOWEN 
INSURANCE, INC. 
Thfrrl Porty Defe11da11t 
and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11323 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
STATFDIF~NT OF CASE 
Plaintiff initiated a declaratory judgment action 
against defendant seeking a determination that defend-
a11t, Insurance Company of North America, provided 
profossional liability insurance to plaintiff on August 9, 
l 966, at approximately 6 :00 o'clock P.M, pursuant to a 
1n·ofo8sional liability insurance policy originally issued 
to him in 1060, which was renewed continuously each year 
!hereafter and attempted to he renewed at the time the 
a(·eidt•nt occurred. 
1 
Defendant filed a Third Pary Complaint against 
L. A. Bowen, Third Party Def en<lant, seeking judgment 
against him decreeing that Third Party Defendant is 
liable to reimburse and pay Third Party Plaintiff all 
costs and expenses of every kind and nature which it 
incurred in investigating and defending the action and 
for any amount paid pursuant to a judgment or settle-
ment or compromise. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO-WER f'.OLTRT 
The case Wfl.s tried to the Honorable .Joseph JI:. 
Nelson sitting ·without a jury, and he awarded plaintiff 
judgment in its favor and against d<:>fendant declaring 
that the professional liability insurance policy issuer1 
by defendant to plaintiff was in force and effect at timr 
and date of the loss. The court also granted Third Party 
Defendant judgment in its favor and against Third Party 
Plaintiff no cause of action on the Third Party Com-
plaint. 
RELIEF SOUGH'l1 
Respondent seeks to have the action of the lower 
court affirmed in c11tering judgment of no cause of 
action upon the Third Party Complaint and in denying 
appellants Motion for New Trial. 
STATE1'11EN'l' OF FACTS 
In discussing the fads of this case, Dr. Gaydon E. 
\Vinger \Vill be referred to as ·winger; Insurance Com-
pany of North America will he referred to as IN A arnl 
L. A. Bowen will he r0f 0rred to as Bowen. 
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Bowen has operated nn insnran<'e agen<'v in Orem . ' 
Utah, under various names, all of which included his own 
name from 1962 to the present time. (TR 113-115 ). Prior 
to his acquisition of the hnsiness h0 now operates, it was 
ow11ecl hy others and was call0<1 tl1e Cordner Agency. 
(TR rn9) From 1962 continuously until December 16, 
1965, Bowen was a licensed agent for INA and as such 
had authority to submit applications for insurance, bind 
coverage, collect premiums, countersign policies and the 
usual authority conferred upon an agent by au insurance 
rompany. (TR 115, 116) 
Sometime i11 1960, Winger obtained a professional 
liability insurance policy from INA through the Cordner 
Ageney. He was advised of the change of ownership of 
that business from Cordner to Bowen in 1962, and he 
also continued to renew his professional liability insur-
anee policy with INA until August of 1966. (TR 123) At 
that time he again attempted to renew the policy through 
Bowen by eompleting a renewal request form mid mail-
ing it with his check to Bowen's office. The policy ex-
pired at 12 :01 A.l\I., August 9, 1966 (Ex 7) and the 
evidence tends to show and the trial court believed that 
the renewal notice with the check for the premium was 
mailed by Winger's wife on August 8, 1966, but was not 
recei,·ed by Bowen until sometime during the evening 
mail dcli\·ery of August 10, 1966. (TR 125, 151-152) At 
approximately 7 :00 o'clock P.M. on August 9, 1966, 
Winger injured a patient whilc working on her teeth 
in his office. ('rH 43) 
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Ou August 10, 19G6, upon receipt of the renewal 
request from \Vinger, Bowen sent a memo to Rulon 
Myers, a licensed agent for INA asking him to renew the 
Winger policy and to hill him (Ex. 26) and on August 
12, 1966, Mr. Myers sent a memo (Ex. 39) to the INA 
office in Salt Lake City, directed to Mr. l\Ierlin Perkins , 
asking that the Winger policy be renewed, stating that 
the policy was formerly with the Boweu Agency. l\Ir. 
Perkins returned the memo to Mr. ~Iyers with the follow-
ing notation written on it: 
Rulon - We are unable to renew or write this 
for you - unless we have the supporting business 
and a letter of record on your behalf. 
Perk. 
Sometime between August 13 and a couple of days 
before the 19th of August, Winger reported the accident 
to Bowen, and he in turn reported it directly to the Salt 
Lake office of INA and dealt directly with that office 
and its representatives in relation to the claim (TR 133-
135) 
In December of 1965, Mr. Bill Webber, manager of 
the Salt Lake office of IN A and Mr. Merlin Perkins, 
who was then in the production department of the com-
pany, came to Bowen's office in Orem, and as a result 
thereof Bowen's agency with the company was termi-
nated. At that time .l\Ir. Perkins advised Bowen how 
sorry he was about what had occurred and he then 
advised Bowen that he, Bowen, could not acquire any 
new business for the company, hut he could keep the 
existing business he had and that renewals of policies 
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should be handled through 1\Ir. Rulon "Myers in Provo. 
( 'l'R 171). On crnss examination of Bowen he admitted 
that he knew he did not have authority to hind coverage 
after the tcrminafom of his agency. There is no evidence 
tliat Bowe11 eyer houll(l or attempted to bind coverage 
after the termination of his agency, and he emphatically 
denied having either bound or attempted to bind coverage 
in the Winger matter. (TR 167-169) 
Upon the termination of the agency relationship be-
tween INA and Bowen no notice was ever given to any-
one by either Bowen or INA of such termination (TR 
290) 
Pursuant to the conversation with l\Ierlin Perkins, 
Bowen did have several business transactions with INA 
through Rulon 1\Iyers wherein existing policies were re-
newed or were to Le renewed. 
In December, 1965 an existing policy on Orem City 
was renewed by Bowen through Rulon 1\Iyers with the 
knowledge of the company. (TR 171-173, Ex. 28-29). In 
August of 1966 two transactions occurred relating to the 
renewal of policies. Bowen sought renewal of two exist-
ing policies with INA on one A. V. Washburn. The 
company knew these came from Bowen and that they 
were renewals of existing policies. In the "\Vashburn 
matter the policies were not renewed because l\Ir. "\Vash-
hnrn did not desire it because the premium was too 
high; however, the company was willing to renew. (TR 
173-176) The other transaction in August, 1966 related 
to the 'Vinger policy. Again, the company knew this was 
a reuewal of an existing policy and that it came from 
Bowen's agency. ( I<}x. 39) 
The other transaction relating to the renewal of an 
existing policy occurred in November or December of 
1966, wherein Bowen <lid not deal through Rulon Myers 
but dealt directly with the Salt Lake office of INA. 
(Ex. 32) That transaction uffolved the renewal of a 
policy of one LeRoy Thorne, which policy was renewed 
by th~~ company. (TR 177-181, Ex. 32-35) 
From all the evidence before it, including the testi-
mony of the witnesses and the exhibits, the Court found 
that the Winger policy "\\'as renewed 011 August 9, 1966 
and that by reason of the conduct of both Bowen and 
INA on Bowen's renewals of policies and INA's ac-
ceptance of said renewals and retaining the henefits 
therefrom without objecting to Bowen's efforts in its 
behalf, that Bowen was an agent of INA in relation to 
the renewal of the ·winger policy. The Trial Court also 
found that in each case of the renewal of an insurance 
policy by insureds of INA through Bowen, the company 
knew that the business was renewal business, that it 
was coming from Bowen. The company knew the insured 
had no knowledge of the termination of the agency rela-
tionship between the company and Bowen; in each case 
the company renewed the policy or would have renewed 
and obtained and retained the premiums on the renewals. 
(R 71) 
INA filed objections to the courts Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law which objections were overrulecl 
and the company's Motion for a New Trial was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN 
LffWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY THE 
RI~VIE\VING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE 
CORRECTED. 
The cases are legion supporting the general propo-
sition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it applies 
to the instant ca12e. No cases have been found by re-
spondent stating a contrary position. 
Not only is tht-re a presumption of validity on appeal 
of the judgment and proceeding in the lower court, but 
the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to de>mon-
strate error, and in the absence of such the judgment 
must he affirmed hy the reviewing court. Leithead vs. 
Adair, 10 U. 2d 282, 351 P. 2d 956; Coombs vs. Perry, 
2 U. 2d 381, 275 P. 2d. Again, on appeal the judgment of 
the trial court is presumpth-ely correct and every rea-
sonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate 
court in favor of it. Burton vs. Zions Co-operati1:e Mer-
cantile Institution .. 122 U. 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Nagle vs. 
Club Fontain.blue, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P. 2cl 346; Petty vs. 
Cindy Jf a,tmufacturing Corporation, 17 U. 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 
30. 
This proposition of law is correct and is binding 
upon the appellate court whether the proceedings in the 
lower court are before a judge only or a judge and jury. 
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charlton 
vs. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176; Universal Invest-
7 
ment Com.painy vs. Carpets, Inc. 16 U. 2d 336, 400 P. 2d 
564; Taylor vs. Johnson, 15 U. 2d 342, 398 P. 2d 382· 
' ' 
Wendelboe vs. Jacobson, 10 U. 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178; 
Hadley vs. Wood, 9 U. 2d 366, 345 P. 2d 197; Daisy 
Distributors, Inc., vs. Local Union 976 Joint Council 67 
' ' Western Conference of Teamsters, 8 U. 2d 124, 329 P. 2d 
414. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND 
AGAINST THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF. 
It is the position of third party defendant, L. A. 
Bowen, that because of the conduct of Insurance Com-
pany of North America in (a) failing to notify anyone 
of the termination of the agency relationship between 
the company and i\Ir. Bowen, (b) advising Mr. Bowen 
to continue to handle existing business he had with them 
such as renewing policies for insureds through a licensed 
agent of the company, ( c) having knowledge of each 
transaction wherein a policy was renewed or attempted 
to be renewed and that such business came from Mr. 
Bowen, ( d) failing to protest to .:\Ir. Bowen his action 
in obtaining the renewal of existing policies with the 
company and failing to prohibit him from such action 
by any means available to it, ( e) actually renewing and 
issuing policies for delivery to Mr. Bowen and subsequent 
delivery to the insured, (f) getting the benefits of such 
transactions by receiving the premiums paid by the 
insured to Mr. Bowen upon the renewal and issuance 
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of the policy, and (g) retaining the benefits of such 
transactions by keeping the insurance premiums received 
from the policies renewed through Mr. Bowen, and (h) 
holding Mr. Bowen out as its agent to all those who 
had become insureds of the company through Mr. 
Bowen's agency while he was a licensed agent of the 
company, that Bowen was an agent of INA at the time 
of the loss in question. 
It is the duty of an insurance company to notify 
insured persons who have dealt with their agent as the 
representative of the company of the termination of his 
authority, and if it fails to do so, it is bound by his acts 
if such a person continues to deal with him as a repre-
sentative of the company, in ignorance of the termination 
of the agency. Southern L. Ins. Co. vs. McCaen, 96 U. S. 
84, 24 L. Ed. 653; W esteru Millers Jfot. Ins. Co. vs. 
Williams, (CA 5 Tex.) 231 F. 2d 425; Southern States 
F. Ins. Co. vs. V mzn, 69 Fla. 549, 68 So. 647; Aetna Ins. 
Co. vs. Stambaugh-Thomps01i Co., 76 Ohio St. 138, 81 
N.1'~. 173; Strm1k vs. Firemans Ins. Co., 160 Pa. 345, 28 
A. 779; Wilson vs. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 51 S.C. 
540, 39 S.E. 245; Tuckers vs. America,n Aviation & Gen .. 
Tus. Co., 193 Tenn. 160, 278 S.W. 2d 677; 29 Am. Jur., 
Insurance, Sec. 144. 
The purpose of this rule of law is, of course, for the 
benefit of third persons who rely on the apparent agency 
for the same purpose relating to insurance coverage, 
often to their detriment. However, coupled with that 
aspect of the rule is the fact that the company either 
in one transaction or in a course of dealing holds the 
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individual out to the public, and possibly to the apparent 
agent himself, as an agent of the company. 
As far as insurance agents are concerrwd, their par. 
ticular authorit~-, such as authority to enter into insnr. 
ance contracts, receive premiums, bind coverage, waive 
provisions o fthe p-0licy, eg., is considered in conjunction 
with the particular matter to which that authority re-
lates. An insurance company, the same as any other 
principal, is liable for the acts done or contracts made 
by one of its agents within the scope of the agent's 
actual or apparent authority. Volker vs. Connecticut 
Fire Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super., 314, 91 A. 2d 883; Sec1trify 
[us. Co. vs. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 P. 151; Dem.ing 
Invest. Co. vs. Shawaee F. Ins. Co., 16 Okla. 1, 83 P. 918 
(rule recognized); Payne vs. New York L. Ins. Co., 173 
·wash. 322, 23 P. 2d 6. An insurance company is also 
liable for the acts of the agent that were unauthorized 
when performed, if such acts arP subsequently ratified 
b~- it. 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, SPc. 145. 
Implied authority of an insurance ageut may arise 
independently of any express grant of authority, as from 
some manifestation of the insurer that the particular 
authority in question shall exist in the agent, or it may 
arise as a necessarv or reasonable implication in order . . 
to effectuate othPr authority expressly conferred. Viele 
vs. Herma111..ea. Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super 314, 01 A. 2d 883; 
Security Ins. Co. vs. Cameron, Supra; Deming ln1;csf-
111ent Co. vs. Shawnee F. Ins. Co., Supra; TV. B. Goode 
d': Co. vs. Georgia Home T11s. Co., 92 Va. 392, 23 S.E. 744. 
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A custom or usage may also confer actual powers 
upon an insurance agent which has not expressly been 
given to him. Lo,ng vs. North British & Merca;ntile Ins. 
Co., 137 Pa. 335, 20 A. 1014; Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. vs. 
llooi:er, 113 Pa. 591, 8 A. 163; Nehring vs. Bast, 258 
Minn. 193, 103 N.\V. 2d 368. 
As the principles of law as discussed so far apply 
to this case, it is the contention of third party defendant 
that 1\lr. Bowen was given express authority after the 
termination of his agency with the company to handle 
ihe renewals of any existing policies he had placed with 
ihe company prior to the termination of his agency. It 
is also contended that the express authority was con-
ferred upon l\Ir. Bowen to solicit renewals of existing 
policies as a licensed agent of the company by reason 
of the attitude and action of the company that such 
authority existed by reason of the company (a) having 
ad,~ised l\Ir. Bowen to conduct himself as he did, (b) 
ha Ying knowledge of his conduct, ( c) failing to protest 
:\fr. Bowen's actions or taking action to nullify them, 
( d) issuing renewal policies for .'.\Ir. Bowen on business 
that existed with his agency prior to the termination of 
his agency, (e) obtaining benefits from Mr. Bowen's 
actions in obtaining the renewals of the policies in the 
form of insurance premiums paid for the policy renewals, 
and (f) retaining the benefits by keeping the premiums 
paid instead of returning the premiums and cancelling 
the policies issued. 
Again, it is contended by third party defendant that 
he had actual authority to solicit the renewal of existing 
11 
policies with Insurance Company of North America be-
cause of the custom aud usage of the company in ac-
quiescing in his action in obtainillg the renewals. 
The conduct of the company i11 neqniescillg- and 
ratifying Mr. Bowen's actions in soliciting renewals of 
policies with the company after the termination of his 
agency with it lends great weight and credence to Mr. 
Bowen's testimony that he was ach·ised by Mr. Merlin 
Perkins that he was authorized to continue to handle 
renewals of existing business with the company of which 
the policy of plaintiff was one. This is so even though 
the letter of the company to Mr. Bowen, dated December 
16, 1965, (Exhibit 124) purports to limit his authority. 
It was after this particular letter was received that the 
company acquiesced in and ratified ~Ir. Bowen's actio11s. 
In relation to ratification of acts of au agellt, an 
illsnrance company, like any other principal, may ratify 
acts or contracts which were performed or made by its 
agent, or hy a person who purported to act as its agent, 
"·ithout authority to bind the company, so as to becomr 
bound thereby. 29 Am. Jur. Insurance, Sec. 15:1. 
Such ratification is equivalent to precedent or origi-
nal authority, and unless the intervening rights of third 
parties would thus be defratecl, relates back to supply 
such original authority. Southern L. lus. Co. vs JtcCaen, 
supra; Terry vs. Pro1:ide1it Fu11rl Snc., 13 Ind. App. 1, 
41 N.E. 18; Kansas Farmers' F. [us. Co. vs. Sai11rlou. 
52 Kan. 486, 35 P. 15; Rirerside Derelopmcnt Co. \'S. 
Hartford F. Ins. Co., 105 Miss. 184, 62 So. 169 (recog-
12 
nizi11g general rule) ; 1ll cDonald vs. JU etro politan L. Ins. 
('o., 68 N.H. 4, 38 A. 500; Eastman vs. Provident Mut. 
Relief Asso., 65 N.H. 176, 18 A. 745; Excelsior F. Ins. 
Co. vs. Rayed Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 343, 14 Am. Ref. 271. 
If an unauthorized person solicits insurance, and the 
insurer accepts the application, it thereby ratifies the 
unauthorized act and places such person on the same 
foundation and invests him with the same authority as 
its commissioned agents insofar as the insured is con-
cerned. See 29 Am .• J ur., Insurance, op. cit. 
An insurer may ratify the receipt of an application 
hy an unauthorized person purporting to act for it, by 
issuing an insurance policy or certificate based upon the 
application. See Eastman vs. Prorident Mut. Relief 
Asso. 65 N.H. 176, 18 A. 745. 
Ratification of such an act or contract may also be 
effected by silence, failure to repudiate or acquiescence 
in it, or by the receipt and retention of the benefits 
issuing therefrom. In Southern L. Ins. Co. vs. McCearn, 
96 U.S. 84, 24 L.Ed. 653, the silence of the company after 
receiving from an agent, whose authority had been ter-
minated, a statement that the premium on a policy had 
heen paid by him was held to be equivalent to the adop-
tion of the act of the agent. See Jlutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 
vs. Robertson, 59 Ill. 123, 14 Am. Rep. 8 ;Masonic Life 
Asso vs. Robinson, 149 Ky. 80, 147 S.W. 882; Horwitz vs. 
Equitable lllut. Ins. Co., 40 :!\Io. 557, 93 Am. Dec. 321; 
Eastman vs. Provident Mut. Relief Asso., supra.; Gish 
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vs. Insurance Comzwny of North America, 16 Okla. 59, 
87 P. 769. 
It is the overwhelming general rule of law that an 
insurance eompany cannot ileeept the henefits of an 
unauthorized transaction and reject its burden; however, 
it is also true that in order for the ratification to be 
binding on the insurer, the act or contract must be one 
which could have been authorized in the first instance. 
See Great Southern L. Ins. Co. vs. Dola11, (Tex. Comm. 
App.) 262 S.vV. 475; 2 Am. Jur. 174, Agency, Sec. 217. 
The insurance company must have knowledge of the 
rrii1terial facts of the transaction or transactions before 
the ratification can be binding upon it. 
Jn 3 Am .• Tur. 2d, Agency Sec. 175 it is stated as 
follows: 
It is an estaiblished principal of the law of 
agency that where a person acts for another who 
accepts or retains the benefits or proceeds of his 
efforts with knowledge of the mutual facts sur-
rounding the transaction, such other must be 
deemed to have ratified the methods employed, 
as he may not, even though innocent, receive or 
retain the benefits of, and at the same time dis-
claim responsibility for, the measures by which 
they were acquired. This general principal ap-
plies, for example, to an unauthorized contract 
affected, an unauthorized lom1 procured on be-
half of the principal or purported principal. If 
the agent procures a contract by fraudulent or 
corrupt practices, although the principal has not 
been privy in any way to such conduct of his 
agent, yet by claiming thP lwnefits of the contract, 
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he must take it tainted as it may he with such 
practiecs. · 
Thr·re arc annotations of this prineiple at 30 A.L.R. 2tl 
~~4; 84 A.L.R. 2d 524; 49 A.L.R. 2d 1277; 48 A.L.R. 926. 
Tn Kansas Farmer's Fire Ins. Co. vs. Saerdon, 
( Knn.) :3;) P. 15 (1893), a person claiming to be a solicitor 
or agent of the plaintiff in error, the fire insurance 
company, on hm'ing in his possession blank applieations 
of the company, rec0ived and forwarded to the company 
an applieatioll endorsed hy him as the solicitor of the 
rompany. The eompany accepted the application from 
the unauthorized Bolicitor and paid him for his services 
:rn solicitor and returned and delivered to him for the 
insured the poliey applied for. Tt received the premium 
011 the poliey through the solicitor less his charge for his 
commission. The Kansas Supreme Court held that in an 
action on the policy in question, the insurance company 
li;wing- 0njoyed the benefits of the acts of the alleged 
solicitor, could not deny that he was its agent for the 
imrpoRe of soliciting and delivering the policy. 
Third party defendant has been unable to find any 
('Hsc with facts exactly as those involved in the instant 
rasc. Howewr, from the authorities cited and the gen-
nnl prineiplt>s of law for ·which they stand, it appears 
11iat hasNl npon the facts of this case, the law as it applies 
to similar transactions and generally to this area, and 
equity and good conscience, the only conclusion that can 
lie reached is tlrnt :Mr. Bowen had authority to solicit 
nnd handle renewal business with defendant. The agency 
trrmi11ated on December of 1965. After that time Mr. 
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Bowen handlc'd re1wwal lmsiness with Insnranre Com. 
pany of North America : 
( 1) The renewal of the Orem City policies which were i11 
fact received through the agency of Rulon l\f yr>rs, but 
with knowledge on the part of Insurance C:ompany of 
North America that said business was heing initiated 
and handled by ~Mr. Bowen. A policy was issued for 
which the company rPcein'd a premium. 
(2) The application for renewal of two policies on a 
Mr. A. V. Washburn, in August, 1966. These were 
handled through the Myers agency but with knowledge 
on the part of the insurance company that Mr. Bowen 
had initiated and was handling the business. In thi' 
case the company was willing to renew th<:' two poliC'iri 
but did not do so only because ~Ir. Bowen and 1Ir. 
·washhurn decided against it. 
(3) The appliration for renewal of tl10 professional lia-
bility policy of plaintiff in this action, Dr. Gaydon E. 
Winger, on August, 1966. This was also handled through 
the Myers ag0ncy hut with knowledge on the part of till' 
company as to where the business came from. See De-
fondant 's FJx. :rn. It is iuteresting to note on that exhibit 
that after being aware of the fart that this was renewal 
business of Mr. Bowen, the compauy did not refuse to 
renew the policy. The statem<:'nt made by the eompany 
was that the policy could not be r<:'ne\\·ed "unless ( <:'mpha-
sis mine) we have the supporting business and a letter of 
record on your lwhalf. Perle" 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it should again be pointed out that 
Insurance Company of North America failed to notify 
anyone of the termination of .Mr. Bowen's agency and in 
doing so continued to hold him out as its agent to policy 
holders that J\Ir. Bowen had acquired for the company. 
For one year thereafter the company then knew that Mr. 
Bowen was handling renewal business for it and made 
no objection to these transactions. In no case was Mr. 
Bowen advised to discontinue his activities with regard 
to renewal business nor in any case was the insured 
advised that Mr. Bowen's agency with the company had 
tennillated. In two cases insurance policies were actually 
renewed and the company received and retained the 
premium which Mr. Bowen had collected. In no case did 
the company cancel the renewed policy and return the 
premium to the insured and advise it that Mr. Bowen 
was no longer its agent. In one case with full knowledge 
of the transaction the company would have renewed two 
policies but ~fr. Bowen and the insured decided otherwise, 
and in the \Vinger matter with full knowledge of the facts 
the eompany would have renewed the Winger policy if it 
could have also written the supporting coverage for him. 
At the trial, Mr. Bowen claimed that representatives 
of the company authorized him to handle renewal busi-
ness with the company. Defendant denies this; however, 
the company's actions involving Mr. Bowen and renewal 
business lends great credence and weight to Mr. Bowen's 
testimony in this regard. 
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Defendant, Insurance Company of North America, 
continuously held Mr. Bowen out as its agent after the 
termination of his agency relationship with it. The com. 
pany tlwrcafter, "·ith full knowledge of all material farts 
in each insta11e0, ratiffr<l th0 acts of ~[r. Bow0n 011 the 
renewal business. It is the position of third party 
defendant that in each transaction invoked after the 
termination of his agency with the company he had 
authority to do what he did with regard to solicitation 
of renewals of policy. Especially is this true in the 
illstant case. 
The judgment of the lower court should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, .BJSQ. 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
18 
